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“To Control Tibet, First Pacify Kham”: Trade Routes and “Official Routes” (Guandao) 
in Easternmost Kham 
 
Patrick Booz, Pennsylvania State University 
 
Abstract 
 
This article focuses on the trade routes in the western Sichuan borderlands that facilitated 
contact and trade between Chinese counties and Eastern Tibet. In particular, the article offers 
a description of “official routes” (guandao)—which the Chinese emperor twice proclaimed to 
be the vital mode of access between China and Tibet—from Chengdu, Sichuan’s provincial 
capital, to Khampa areas, with Lhasa as the final destination. The exchange of goods in this 
region followed various routes during different periods. From the tenth to sixteenth centuries, 
transactions occurred primarily along the borders of Amdo (Tib. A mdo, Northeastern Tibet), 
but for political, economic, and practical reasons, such exchanges became more limited 
geographically and eventually focused along the Sichuan–Kham/Ngawa border. Many routes 
shifted to the towns of Kangding (Tib. Dartsedo) and Songpan (Tib. Zungchu), the main sites 
of distribution, where rich opportunities for trade and a strictly limiting transport geography 
made them important entrepôts that evolved into centers of prosperity. The geographic range 
of this article reaches to these two towns and leaves the investigation of the routes that led to 
western centers such as Derge, Batang, Chamdo, and Jyekundo for future research. 
 
Keywords: Tibet, China, trade routes, official routes, guandao, tea, chama gudao, tea-horse 
trade, commodities, borderlands, Songpan, Kangding, Dartsedo, Kham, Ngawa, Sichuan, 
Luding, Dadu He, Kangxi, Manchu 
 
Introduction 
We know that the rise and interplay of trade and accompanying trading routes have been a 
driving force in history. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith highlighted the disparate 
distribution of resources and trading propensities and stated the commonplace that we trade 
for what we want in order to get what we do not have. We must also acknowledge the value 
of exchange and of the entire trading enterprise, with the concomitant economic, social, and 
strategic factors that result from trading relationships. 
In addressing the long history of trade and contact in the Sino-Tibetan border regions, 
this article looks at the importance of trade in the context of how and why known and 
documented routes came into being, and, more specifically, at practical developments in the 
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western Sichuan borderlands. At the center of this long-standing relationship was brick tea, a 
commodity grown, processed, packaged, and controlled solely by China and desired by 
Tibet.1 For barter exchange, the Chinese sought to fulfill their requirement for strong horses 
of cavalry quality, which indigenous husbandry was unable to produce. They went to the 
borders of Tibet with tea to trade for good steppe horses. These borderlands witnessed the 
rise of this vital enterprise, which at first took place in the north, but later, as described here, 
turned directly westward from the tea-growing areas of Sichuan Province. 
Tibetans first encountered Chinese tea more than a thousand years ago, most probably 
in the early eighth century,2 and they took to the new beverage with progressive enthusiasm.3 
Large volumes of tea came their way for the first time in the eleventh century, when China 
moved to establish the strategic tea–horse trade to secure Central Asian horses for military 
defense (Smith 1991, 23). This decisive period in the development of regular exchange has 
been documented by historian Paul Smith (1991), who also provides the rationale for trade 
routes and their adoption and construction. 
The link between trade and the projection of power, a primary focus of this article, is 
revealed through the Chinese and Manchu imperial creation and naming of two “official 
routes” (guandao) in which tea played a major part. Different in time and place, but 
important for comparison, is historian Peter Perdue’s 2015 discussion of the manja (tea) 
trade, one of many border trades conducted around the frontiers of the Qing Empire during its 
period of expansion. Specifically, Perdue deals with the struggles over Central Asia between 
the Qing and the Zunghar Mongols. He points out that there were periods of truce in the mid-
1700s, which allowed for trade relations. Such times centered on the manja tea trade; the 
Zunghars sought contact and influence in Lhasa, and the Qing in turn gathered information 
about the goals and intentions of the Mongols. This time of peace “provides an important 
example of the Qing usage of border trade for diplomatic and economic gain” (Perdue 2015, 
2). Parallels can be drawn with the tea–horse exchange, as shown below. 
From the symbiosis between China and Tibet and the evolution of trading routes came 
the special name chama gudao, or “tea–horse routes” (also “ancient tea–horse roads”). The 
term chama gudao has legitimacy within certain contexts of time and place, but these need to 
be based on actual economic encounters of these two commodities and not fabricated stories.4 
This article clarifies the context and periods of the chama gudao in Sichuan. These “tea–
horse routes”—correctly interpreted in a limited, regional way, as opposed to an unlikely 
macro or even international setting—referred to three main roads that led from China to three 
trading towns in the border zones of Kham and adjacent Ngawa. These were Zhongdian (Tib. 
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Rgyal thang) in the south, Kangding (Tib. Dar rtse mdo) in the center, and Songpan (Tib. 
Zung chu) in the north. Our concern here is with the last two sites, because the first—
Zhongdian in Yunnan—has been of minor significance, and Sichuan commanded the lion’s 
share of trade with Tibet. 
 Although the early centuries of the tea–horse trade took place along the borders of 
Shaanxi and Gansu in China’s north, there were exceptions and interruptions. A famous case 
occurred when the Northern Song dynasty collapsed in 1127 under invasions by the Jurchens, 
denying Chinese access to the pasturelands that produced the “blood-sweating” Central Asian 
horses they needed. Because of this loss of territory and severing of trade routes, China’s 
merchants, both government and private, looked west from Sichuan to Kham for the 
fulfillment of the tea–horse arrangements (Rossabi 1970, 140–142). This new focus came 
about out of necessity, and the exchanges became more limited geographically during the late 
fourteenth century and then wholeheartedly at the start of the eighteenth century, when 
economic and geopolitical factors concentrated trade almost entirely along the border zones 
of Sichuan–Kham/Ngawa. Thus, Sichuan, the focus of this article, grew, prepared, and 
supplied the main commodity and initiated the routes for transporting it, thereby fulfilling the 
role of tea supplier to Tibet. 
I will present the main Sichuan routes in the central zone first, in order to note the 
numerous types of routes. Twice in this border area the Chinese imperium established, 
maintained, and supervised guandao. 
 
The Setting and Range of Sichuan Trade Routes 
Historian Fernand Braudel wrote of the important role played by commodities and 
trade “at the lower levels, within the modest circle of the local, sometimes very localized 
economy” (1992, 135). This is an apt observation for the areas in question, in which Chinese 
and Tibetans engaged vibrantly over long periods, notwithstanding Braudel’s observation that 
“civilizations can’t climb hills,” and anthropologist James Scott’s statement that “the hills, 
however, are… a zone of cultural refusal” (2009, 20). Still, and significantly, Braudel asserts 
that different civilizations and regions have the ability to overcome barriers—actual and 
figurative—through trading activity, even when the regions are completely foreign to one 
another. He concludes that the larger economy created through contact “is a sum of 
individualized areas, economic and non-economic, which it brings together… and that it 
usually goes beyond the boundaries of division” (Braudel 1992, 24). Barriers come down and 
towns spring up wherever there are the crossroads of trade. 
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In Sichuan, the practical core of this trade—production in China and delivery of 
manufactured goods, especially tea bricks, into the hands of Tibetans—took place within a 
geographical ellipse of just 220 kilometers from east to west and 160 kilometers from north 
to south. This oval of activity, embodying the power inherent in the exchange of goods, 
witnessed the varied stages of trade, which manifested particular local adaptations to the 
special requirements of production, geography, and transport (see map 1). 
Despite larger social, ethnic, and geopolitical concerns, anthropologist Tina Harris 
rightly points out that routes and trade relations are established locally through everyday life. 
Trade routes are consciously opened, made, and contested based on common practicalities, 
such as cost, efficiency, and opportunity. And trade has geographical dimensions as well, in 
which geography goes hand in hand with “actors who work within the limitations imposed by 
states” (Harris 2013, 111–112) and the available commodities. Harris emphasizes the strong 
sense of place and brings things down to earth by always stressing goods, merchants, objects, 
and markets, and the reasons why particular routes developed (Harris 2013). These 
considerations, though modern in her treatment, can be seen to play directly into the story of 
Sichuan’s trade and trade routes. 
For the past thousand years, Tibet’s tea has come almost entirely from Sichuan 
Province, and specifically from the five “tea counties” of Ya’an, Mingshan, Qionglai, 
Tianquan, and Yingjing, where growing conditions proved ideal and the technology of brick 
tea manufacturing was perfected.5 From the factories in these counties came annually the 
millions of kilograms of compressed tea that satisfied Tibet’s monasteries, lamas, and 
wealthy families. From these points of departure, the tea made its way north to Amdo by 
wheelbarrow transport before being transferred to Tibetan animals. Later, in the Ming 
dynasty (1368–1644), as we shall see, the commodity crossed westward over mountainous 
regions where Sichuan’s counties approached and abutted the historic dividing zone between 
China and Tibet. Then, by means of trails and roads, the tea penetrated into the easternmost 
parts of Kham and Ngawa as a means to distribute products and engage in other concerns, as 
varied as pilgrimage and geopolitics. This network of trade and contact, as it crossed over a 
barrier range and large river, became a major force in regional history and economics. From 
the Tibetan point of view, as pointed out by Buddhist scholar Matthew Kapstein, we know 
that trade has always been one of the three major traditional occupations of Tibet—
pastoralism and farming being the other two—and thus we see the undeniable role of 
commodity economics (Kapstein 2006, 18). 
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Map 1.  Major trade routes from Sichuan to Easternmost Tibet: 1. Han dynasty route, 56/57 
C.E. (Yingjing County); 2. Yajiageng route, c. 500 C.E. (Dadu River, Moxi, Yajiageng Pass); 
3. Ya’an to Xiaojin route (Baoshan, Xiaojin [Btsan lha rdzong]); 4. Yanzhou route: Ming 
dynasty official route, 1397 (Tianquan to Yanzhou [today’s Lan’an], Dadu River); 5. Big 
route (Dalu): Qing dynasty official route, 1708 (Ya’an, Yingjing, Qingxi, Sanjiao, Feiyueling 
Pass, Hualinping, Luding); 6. Ma’an shan route, early 1700s; 7. Small route (xiaolu), 1939 
(Ya’an, Tianquan, Erlang Shan, Luding; this is today’s motor vehicle road from Ya’an to 
Luding and Kangding). Source: Created by Patrick Booz and Rémi Chaix, based on data 
from NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). 
 
The products of the Sichuan Basin, which fed the trade with Tibet, took many forms 
in the preparation and packaging of these riches for the journey to Kham. Different counties 
had different products based on their respective ecological, material, cultural, and technical 
endowments, which allowed them to provide goods and products that Tibetans and other 
ethnic groups in the border area wanted. These commodities fulfilled both local and long-
distance demands. The main items included tea, silk brocade, and other textiles, but also 
dozens of other goods, such as khata (silk ceremonial scarves), high-quality ink, jewelry 
(zhubao), porcelain and china vessels, all types of cloth and dyes, paper products, shoes, 
tobacco, opium, foodstuffs and grains (particularly wheat and rice for wealthy Tibetans, and 
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also Chinese garrisons), items of daily use (padlocks, hardware, toiletries, needles, combs, 
mirrors, buttons, writing brushes), and later matches, wristwatches, pistols, rifles, and 
ammunition. Of special value were metal products: copper and iron goods (tongtie), tools, tin 
utensils, knives, iron plowshares, copper bottles (for heating wine), kettles, pots, bowls, tea 
caddies, and many other day-to-day metal items. The different border counties of Sichuan 
funneled such products to the appropriate, or accessible, roads for the journey to Eastern 
Tibet, primarily the two towns of Kangding and Songpan.6  
The common understanding of a tea–horse trade had validity and usefulness at certain 
times. But in the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644), and especially during the Qing (1644–
1911), the border trade, called chama hushi (Ch. tea–horse exchange), should more correctly 
be called chatu jiaoliu (Ch. tea–local products trade)—that is, the constellation of 
arrangements, interactions, and trading of tea for Tibetan goods. This often-overlooked 
transition to chatu jiaoliu had huge implications, for it meant that large volumes of desired, 
tradable Tibetan items, heretofore adjuncts to the horse trade, now began to find their full 
potential on the scale of value. Musk, medicinal herbs, gold bullion, deer antlers, pelts, skins, 
yak tails, wool, and many other products were gathered and processed throughout Kham, 
traded primarily for tea, and then transported east to China. 
More than a dozen routes existed between China and Tibet in the Sichuan region; it is 
revealing to note these varied lines of communication through time and their special 
characteristics, which account for the diversity of roads. The destinations of goods and the 
distances involved prompted probes for trails of efficiency and least difficulty. Because of the 
mountainous terrain and vast landscapes, there have never been easy transecting routes in the 
geographic domain of the barrier range, but we see that both nature and man-made efforts 
combined to make routes workable. Against this background, we can begin to evaluate the 
cat’s cradle of trade routes by first looking at the land. The risks of adhering to a misleading 
environmental determinism are always present, yet one must understand the geography, 
orography, valleys, passes, hydrology, weather, geology, and routes in the mountains that can 
be negotiated by heavily laden humans. 
The long interface and merging of Tibetan areas with non-Tibetan neighbors to the 
east extends from northern Burma nearly to Inner Mongolia. This complicated topography is 
the geographic platform for investigating trade and trade routes on the frontier, and the 
existence of long-standing plateau contact with China, for these regions of easternmost Tibet, 
“could and never can escape their locational proximity to China and can never be neglected 
in terms of potential economic integration” (van Spengen 2000, 35). Medical anthropologist 
Booz  33  
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 19 (June 2016) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-19) 
Mona Schrempf has researched the northern areas of this interface, specifically the trading 
center of Songpan. Lessons learned from her investigation show both differences and 
similarities to the Kangding routes, which carried a much larger volume of trade. Schrempf 
describes an ever-changing sociopolitical world in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands and engages 
with the area in a number of ways—geographical, multiethnic, and historical—through an 
interpretation of Hwa shang, a historical character famous for defending Chinese Chan 
Buddhism against an Indian monk who spoke on behalf of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism in a 
debate in Tibet in 793. Hwa shang represents Tibetan relations with Chinese authorities. In 
emphasizing the varied legitimizations of the long-standing political connections between 
China and Tibet, Schrempf also reveals the continuities in trade (Schrempf 2006, 7).7 This 
search for stability was at the center of the Ya’an–Kangding economic exchange as well 
(Schrempf 2006, 1–3, 20). 
Historian Jack Patrick Hayes, also researching Songpan, emphasizes how the 
surrounding regions were linked both to one another and to the greater Chinese economy. 
Songpan was an early and vital entrance point for Chinese goods, administrators, and armies, 
as well as a site for commodity convergence. Here, the broader Tibetan and Chinese worlds 
met at a node of three major trade routes (Hayes 2010). Another treatment of the northern 
zone, by anthropologist and historian Marie-Paule Hille, cites the trade relations of the 
Xidaotang Sufis, whose religious, moral, and socioeconomic organization stood firmly as 
their source of success with Tibet and trade. Pragmatically, they used highland and lowland 
products, as with the Sichuan counties, and established long-standing relationships with 
individuals and monasteries, also like the main trading houses in Kangding. Their goal was to 
find and maintain permanent contacts, not short-term profit. This closely matches the 
underlying motivation and ethos of the Kangding trade (Hille 2015, 180–186). 
This central route from Ya’an to Kangding crystallized in a small geographical area 
the main problems and solutions of the commodity trade. Kangding itself was strategically 
important because it lay at the convergence of major roads going to Sichuan, Yunnan, and 
Central Tibet, with numerous branch routes into Kham. The same can be said of Songpan to 
the north, though on a smaller scale, with trails primarily linked to Ngawa (Aba), Gyarong, 
Kokonor, broader Amdo, and finally reaching Jyekundo (Yushu), Nagchu, and Lhasa. In 
short, the unfolding of trade should be seen within the wider context of Chinese and Tibetan 
interaction and from a long-term geohistorical perspective. Geographer Wim van Spengen’s 
assertions of “the inseparability of geography and history” and the fact that “certain themes 
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and regions command a higher interest at certain times than others” have poignancy here (van 
Spengen 2000, 35). 
The earliest historical record we have for a road from the Chinese counties to the 
Tibetan zone of Eastern Kham goes back to 56 C.E., when Han dynasty militarists constructed 
a route through today’s Yingjing County to the border range. This shows that sometimes the 
purpose of a road is primarily coercion and secondarily trade. The building of the road was 
done as a show of force, confirming anthropologist Thomas Barfield’s observation that routes 
have been used to intimidate or force alliances or to compel trade (1989, 249). The road, 
strictly controlled by soldiers and officials, and for sanctioned trade only, allowed access to 
the border zones and projected Chinese power. It fell into disuse after the collapse of the Han 
dynasty in 220 C.E. (Barfield 1989).8 
A longer route, easier to follow, dates back some 1,500 years. It progressed south-
southwest from the populated areas of Chengdu and Ya’an, along the river valley of the Dadu 
to Hanyuan, then west and north into easternmost Kham and along ancient trails to Kangding 
via Moxi and the Yajiageng Pass. This is a good example of a natural route, long though it 
was, that relied on a river valley for penetration and the lowest mountain pass to reach the 
desired destination. At times, one must also look at human geography and belief systems to 
further understand roadways, movement, and trade. 
Familiarity with Tibet allows identification of pilgrimage routes, linked to religious 
and geomantic power places and sacred mountains. In the case of Kham and the Sino-Tibetan 
borders, main trails crossing the Ma’an Shan Pass and Feiyueling Pass fulfilled such a 
position in the minds of Tibetans for a thousand years because of holy Emei Mountain in 
Sichuan Province, loco sacro of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra (Tib. Kun-tu bzang-po, Ch. 
Pu Xian) (Hargett 2006). Commodity exchange and commerce at all levels also occurred on 
these pilgrim paths, where religion and trade intermingled. For Tibetans, the opening of such 
trading routes—indeed, the opening of all pathways—is both material and spiritual. 
Tibetologist Charles Ramble (1997) has commented on these dual themes and has also shown 
how, for Tibetans if not Chinese, the creation of new routes involved the taming of 
wilderness by actual and symbolic subjugation of its harmful and demonic forces. 
Any survey of a regional trade map, or a walk across the land itself, reveals that—
apart from the main points of departure and destination and related connecting lines of 
communication—there will invariably be gaps in the distribution of routes. Generally 
speaking, and except in truly remote areas where the frontier has its own frontier, people live 
in these interstices, and secondary towns and markets stand in seeming isolation. So there is a 
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calling for and reasons for secondary and tertiary routes that cover these gaps in the 
topographic map. Local people, local needs, and local transport come to the fore, and careful 
investigation can identify these lesser-known, but nevertheless locally vital, routes. The 
clearest example of such a road in Sichuan, dating back centuries, goes from Ya’an to 
Baoxing and on into the Khampa-Ngawa regions of Xiaojin, Jinchuan, and Danba. There are 
also many others. 
New or expanded routes took hold when new types of transport imposed themselves, 
such as the transition from foot to horses and mules, or when the growth in trading volume 
demanded a larger or wider road, where horses could pass two abreast. A definitive example 
of this occurred in the eighteenth century, when an officially sanctioned road demanded 
enlargement (see below). The introduction of carts, and much later motor vehicles, also 
required expansion. Hand in hand with these factors is always the availability of local and 
imported labor to undertake the building of new roads or the widening of old roads. The 
social life of roads and trails is affected by many factors that alter their configuration and use. 
More direct, yet more difficult, shortcuts that aspired to shave off hours of transport time and 
sometimes saved one or two days of walking came into common use if genuinely efficacious 
and worth the extra expenditure of energy for time saved. The Xin Lu (New Road)—which 
traversed from Yingjing and crossed Hanyuan County in an arrow-like line to find a breach in 
the barrier range, finally reaching Lengqi was such a shortcut, dating to about 1890. The 
prominence of certain trade routes could fluctuate because of positional shifts in production, 
or even a change in consumer demand or other productive capacities. Good examples are the 
tea-producing counties of Mingshan and Qionglai (Qiongzhou), which, because of economic 
declines in the Ya’an-Kangding market in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
shifted their silk production and tea output to the northern trade route, which led from 
Dujiangyan to Songpan (see A. D. 1883).9 
Historian John Flower expands the idea of a road’s meaning and potential, and the 
innate correspondence between road building, power, and hybridity, which is defined as the 
“material and spiritual forces that form the essence of roads” (2004, 651). Echoing Braudel, 
he states that road building advances material civilization and, for good or ill, opens different 
societies to different potentialities, where integration and sometimes confrontation can take 
place at different levels. The following observation resonates from ancient times to the 
present: “Roads are symbolically charged, they both are and stand for economic development 
itself and are very concrete embodiments of hope” (Flower 2004, 651–652). They also can be 
the sharp point of expansion and dominance. Road building, commitment of resources, and 
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the permanent presence of loyal personnel give legitimacy to the builder and reinforce 
territorial claims or other aspirations of the instigator (see below). 
Hazards and dangers of the road took many forms, from earthquakes and landslides to 
robbers and bandits. Traders and travelers avoided certain routes because of disease, or wars 
and violence. Eastern Tibet faced such conditions most glaringly during the eighteenth-
century Jinchuan wars and the nineteenth-century uprising of Gönpo Namgyel.10 Smugglers’ 
routes flourished during periods when tea was monopolized by the Sichuan government, such 
as during the Ming dynasty and under Zhao Erfeng in the late Qing (Yingjing wenshi 1989, 
13). Such smuggling of tea and silk by independent merchants took place especially in the 
Tianquan-Luding area. 
This brief survey of road types leads to the most significant of all, the “official routes” 
that commanded attention at important historical moments. 
 
The Official Routes (Guandao) 
Routes that received official recognition, government funding for building and 
maintenance, or special status for officials, armies, and postal systems endured with higher 
quality and regularity, so long as the funding and recognition held. Well-known examples in 
Europe include the various categories of Roman roads and, in Eastern Europe, the official 
route to the West opened by Peter the Great of Russia in the late seventeenth century. In 
China, the sanctioned “official routes” (guandao) were based on geopolitical concerns and 
trade or military opportunism. These routes came into existence, or were affirmed, by official 
decree from the emperor himself. This happened twice in direct connection with trade routes 
in western Sichuan that led to Tibet. The motives and impetus for creating the two Sichuan 
guandao, though not identical and separated by three hundred years, were nevertheless linked 
by three overarching themes: Chinese desire for trade expansion; such trade combined with 
territorial encroachment; and use of both of the former motivations to exert greater control 
over Tibetans and Tibetan commercial and military activities in the border zones. 
We know that the all-important brick tea, created by the Chinese, was a commodity of 
destination—an object intended by its producers solely for export and exchange; the Chinese 
never boiled or drank it, and in fact belittled this form of tea. For the Tibetans, the highly 
desired brick tea was entirely an inward-directed trade (Booz 2011, 27–30). As far back as 
the eleventh century, Yazhou (Ya’an) and the surrounding tea counties became the primary 
suppliers of tea to Tibet. Most was transported by wheelbarrow to Shaanxi and Gansu in the 
north, but a considerable amount, perhaps 15 percent of the total volume at that time and up 
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until the seventeenth century, went to local Tibetans—that is, to Khampas. Tradition required 
that these men travel the long distances eastward from Kham, cross the Dadu River, traverse 
the barrier range, and finally arrive at Yazhou to conduct the tea–horse business. It was here 
that Chinese officials scrutinized Tibetan horses for purchase and negotiated a price with the 
Tibetan traders. So, for centuries, Tibetans with their pack animals were compelled to travel 
this arduous, time-consuming route into Chinese territory in order to secure tea (Sheng 1994, 
72). Such a long-standing and strictly enforced agreement made sense for the Chinese, 
because it neutralized the Tibetans deep inside Chinese territory and allowed factories and 
officials to closely observe and tightly control the tea transactions. In addition, with Tibetans 
arriving at its doorstep, the government escaped the responsibility of transporting the huge 
loads, as was necessitated by tea shipments to the north. But for the Tibetans, such 
arrangements were cumbersome and odious. 
A series of events in the late fourteenth century deal with a trade route—the first 
guandao to come into existence—that stands as a prime example for understanding the 
unique history of an individual road. This route’s history coherently shows the geography, 
practicalities, rationale, and justification for the expansion of trade, and presages events that 
came to the fore much later in the creation of Sichuan’s second guandao. This first “official 
road” on the Kham border resulted from the unsatisfactory conditions described above, and 
we can see that it succeeded in its goals. 
The advantages of geographic proximity and a narrowing locus of trade—avoiding 
the long, difficult shipments of tea and other goods to Gansu and Shaanxi in the northwest—
combined with the realization that horses (albeit of a lower quality) could be acquired, made 
real the prospects for Kham to become a ready and practical trading partner. These 
aspirations took form by shifting the trade marts directly westward into Tibetan territory. But 
how was such an arrangement to be put into place with the Tibetans, who were seen as unruly 
and dangerous by the Chinese? The strategic barrier range passes of Ma’an Shan and 
Feiyueling (2,830 meters) stood as military outposts for the control of tea; no tea was allowed 
to be carried beyond the passes into Kham, thus forcing Tibetans to continue to enter China 
to get their tea (Yang 2006, 126). 
Officials and traders between Tibet and Sichuan considered the Dadu River to be the 
functional border between the two regions; Chinese people rarely, if ever, crossed into the 
“barbarian lands” (Ch. fandi) on the west bank, but Tibetans had to travel east across the river 
to conduct business (He 1991, 9). This tiresome method of getting tea in Yazhou frustrated 
not only the Tibetans, but alert Chinese officials and merchants saw it as a hindrance to the 
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overall value and purpose of the tea–horse trade. But, first things first. In 1387, a local 
Sichuan official named Gao Weishan reported to the emperor six advantages to establishing a 
new trading route to a new trading center farther to the west. This marked the potential role 
of Yanzhou (today’s Lan’an, not to be confused with Yazhou), whose position on the western 
face of the barrier range made it a radical and attractive alternative. Gao’s intention in writing 
was to highlight the practicalities of the new route, and his first point, perhaps to curry favor 
with the emperor, dealt with security (i.e., keeping the Tibetans under control). After that he 
got down to the nuts and bolts of what the new enterprising vision would entail: 
1. If we set up a market in Yanzhou, then the barbarians (Ch. fanmin) will 
depend on us, and thus not be out of control. 2. We should ask the people of 
Diaomen’s liufan zhaotaosi [“military organization of the six barbarian 
offices; tribal areas”] to make pressed black tea [Ch. wucha] only, and 
transport it to Yanzhou to exchange for horses. [The advantage would be to 
have all tea made into bricks for the Tibetans; the transport distance was 
short.] 3. Compared to exchanging horses in Yazhou, this site in Yanzhou will 
be much more profitable. 4. Dajianlu [Dartsedo] will be close to this horse 
trading site [yimaqu]; if we do so, the fanmin must all come to us. 5. If we set 
up a place to exchange horses in Yanzhou, then there must be lots of fanmin 
who will come here to buy tea, and we can double the tax, or raise it several 
times more, and they will bring more products. 6. We can fix the road from 
Diaomen to Yanzhou for the traffic. (Quoted in Zeng and Yang 1989, 18)11 
 
Two years later, officials repeated the main points of this plan to move the tea trade west: 
Every year barbarian merchants [Ch. fanshang] from Changhexi12 exchange 
horses for tea at the Yazhou chamasi [tea–horse office]. We give them so 
much [tea] mainly because the road that those barbarian merchants travel is 
very far. This is both too far for the barbarian merchants to travel, and gives 
them too much tea. We should decrease the price of the horses and move the 
chamasi to Yanzhou, and also transport the tea. (Quoted in Li and Liu 1989, 
54) 
 
The emperor granted permission, which precipitated the practical development of 
Yanzhou. The town became a major transshipment center for goods and the proposed 
benefits were indeed realized. It had a garrison, many tea warehouses, and a market where 
people conducted the tea–horse trade (Luding xianxhi 1999, 611). Yanzhou, being closer to 
Kangding, shifted the Chinese sphere of influence over the passes into Tibetan territory,13 and 
was good for business because it made travel and trade easier for the enthusiastic Tibetan 
buyers. It also brought an expanding Chinese population over the barrier range into Kham, 
steadily assimilating locals and creating the first steps toward annexation of Tibetan territory. 
Thus, by the late fourteenth century, the site superseded the long-standing Yazhou 
arrangement, making Yanzhou the official tea–horse market of exchange (Ch. chama hushi) 
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(Yingjing Wenshi 1989, 1–2). The route from Diaomen (Tianquan) carried tea from the 
Chinese factories over the Yanzhou Pass and into Kham. The central government declared 
this to be the only permissible way to travel westward, and thus it became the main route to 
Tibet from Sichuan, proceeding directly west across the Dadu River to Kangding and onward 
to Litang, Batang, Chamdo, and finally Lhasa (Wu 1995, 28). In 1397, an imperial 
proclamation designated this as one of only two Chinese official roads to Tibet (Li and Liu 
1989, 55–56). The other was from China’s northwestern Shaanxi Province. 
This earlier of the two official initiatives to establish a road west from Sichuan to 
Kham was based on close, direct contact with Tibetans under controlled conditions and 
circumstances as they pertained to the tea–horse exchange. In the Ming dynasty, the emphasis 
was on the trade mart; for the second guandao, during the Qing, it was trade after the fact of 
military conquest. But in both cases the emperor considered the official designation along 
this sector of the Sino-Tibetan border to be vital. There was a saying—“To control Tibet, first 
pacify Kham” (zhi zang bi xian an kang)—and this became an expression of China’s imperial 
intention and might (Li 2004). 
The background of the Qing-dynasty guandao is important because it lays out the 
reasons for direct Manchu invasion of Eastern Kham. The Manchus considered everything 
east of Dartsedo (Kangding), but practically east of the Dadu River, to be part of the “inner 
territory of the empire” (Ch. neidi) (Ahmad 1970, 81). This question of boundaries is vital, 
and Jack Hayes notes that both economic and political boundaries were fuzzy, prompting the 
Qing to clear up this unsettled state. And Perdue adds: “The story of the eighteenth-century 
Qing empire is of an effort to seal off this ambiguous, threatening frontier experience once 
and for all by incorporating it within the fixed boundaries of a distinctly defined space, and 
by drawing lines that clearly demarcated separate cultures” (2005, 41, 42). 
The Manchu presence in Eastern Kham from 1699 or 1700 onward irrevocably 
altered many aspects of border life, including the brick tea trade to Tibet, further 
concentrating it along this central border route that linked Ya’an to Kangding (Dartsedo). The 
Tibetans, however, felt strongly about their claims, as expressed by Shakabpa. “Dartsedo has 
been a part of Tibet since ancient times.… This region has been left as a territory where laws 
were only loosely enforced, without collecting taxes, and left broadly within Tibetan 
territory” (Shakabpa 2010, 1:91). He goes on to blame others for the conflict over control. 
“Nevertheless, because of the activities of certain Chinese and Tibetan leaders, they argued 
that Dartsedo was Chinese territory, and furthermore some Chinese claimed that even 
Minyak [Tib. Mi nyag] belonged to China” (Xiageba 1976, 265, 266). Shakabpa’s summing 
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up of the situation shows the ambiguous status of the area, with its potential for conflict 
(Ahmad 1970, 310, 322). Shortly thereafter, crisis did come, and this shows in stark relief the 
importance of routes, and above all the power of a bridge. 
The actual presence of the Qing in the border area before 1700 included only minor 
outposts; they had no presence in Kangding, though designs of China and Tibet were 
converging on the town. The Qing believed that having a direct hand in the area would bring 
Eastern Kham increasingly under their control, with the larger goal of neutralizing the 
Tibetans and promoting territorial expansion. Road building was a central element of this 
plan, with the goal of uninterrupted access from Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan, 
all the way to Kangding. 
The Kangxi emperor (r. 1661–1722) stated: “Tibetans love the small profit very 
much. When collecting tax, do not impose tax on them, just on merchants of our country.… 
[We] pay no attention to profit; if the tax is heavy, the Tibetans will not come” (Kangding 
xianzhi 1995, 163). This was part of an overall policy to win over the Tibetans, with 
concessions for trade, but with Qing dominance—and, specifically, Qing oversight and 
administration of the trading routes—as the goal. In 1699, the Sichuan governor (Ch. xunfu) 
Bei Henuo, reported to Kangxi on matters in the Kangding area, indicating a healthy 
environment for trade (“Xikang jingji de zhongxin” 1994). 
Until that time, Chinese rarely ventured beyond the Dadu River to Kangding. The 
discussion above of Yanzhou as the first guandao affirms this—there was no flourishing of 
commerce farther to the west, beyond the Dadu; no bridge spanned the river at that time. Yet 
tea was highly desired by the monasteries and monks of Kangding, who would be happy to 
do business. Once again, as in the late fourteenth century, Chinese merchants saw the 
advantage of moving the markets westward. Petitioning the emperor for the right to establish 
Kangding, 50 kilometers west of Yanzhou, as the main trade mart was an obvious next step. 
 In 1693, Sangye Gyatso, the Tibetan regent representing the sixth Dalai Lama (b. 
1683), wrote to Kangxi seeking explicit approval to open the road and “to set up a market” 
(Ch. jiaoshi zhishi) at Dartsedo (Yang 2006, 126–127). Manchu interest in the area, piqued 
by security and trade concerns, led to increasing involvement (Ahmad 1970, 63, 322).14 As 
Dai Yingcong emphasizes, the years 1696–1697 were pivotal in Qing frontier strategy: “The 
magnitude of the Tibet question was tremendously elevated” (2010, 8). 
In 1699, events spilled over into large-scale violence. The Battle of Dartsedo ended 
the short war (1699–1701), which placed the Qing in a position of undisputed strength in the 
border localities. Tang Xishun quickly took military control and stabilized trade (Yang 2006, 
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126).15 This is remembered as the moment when strong Chinese involvement in Kangding 
began; apart from military and political control, it prepared the way for roadways and 
expansion of the tea trade on a major scale (“Xikang jingji de zhongxin” 1994, 420). In 1702, 
the Qing court formally called Kangding (Dartsedo) “the trade market between Tibetan and 
Han” (zanghan shangmao shichang), and the emperor dispatched officials there to oversee 
the tea trade.16 The Qing seized the moment to embark on projects to secure their position 
and guarantee better conditions for both military control and trade expansion. 
First, they built a broad, 60-kilometer road through Zanli, Pengba, Lengzhuguan, 
Wasigou, and up the side valley leading to Kangding (“Xikang jingji de zhongxin” 1994, 
419). Second, Sichuan officials began planning and building the first bridge over the Dadu 
River. This bridge, known to Chinese as Luding Qiao and to Tibetans as Chagzamka,17 
proved symbolically and practically to be the culmination and ultimate consolidation of Qing 
power. Transport, trade, communication, and military mobility into Kham were now theirs. 
After the bridge’s completion and the rationalization of the routes from Chengdu to 
Yazhou (Ya’an), which linked all transport to the new roads west of the river, Kangxi used 
the occasion to proclaim the Manchu successes; to comment on history, transport, geography, 
and bridge construction; and to praise the road-and-bridge engineers. The emperor boasted 
that “thousands of li of territory have now become part of my map,” all made possible by the 
roads and bridge, which combined to gain the status of guandao, the official route to Tibet: 
 
Therefore, the road to Dajianlu [Dartsedo, Kangding] goes through. If one 
went to Dajianlu, it was necessary to cross the Lushui [Dadu River], but there 
was no bridge to go across…. With the completed bridge, all 
communications—orders and post mail, vehicles [che] of the military, the 
civilians and the merchants—all can go smoothly and quickly, instead of 
being worried sick by obstacles along the way. I feel deeply satisfied about the 
picture [tu] of the bridge. Thus I honor it with the name Lu Ding [“Lu River is 
pacified”]. (Gao 1990, 521) 
 
The consequences of the successful spanning of the Dadu River in 1706 cannot be 
overemphasized. Before this major act, the Dadu existed as the de facto delimiting border 
between China and Tibet. Luding Bridge now became the link in an uninterrupted road, wide 
enough for horses and armies, connecting central Sichuan and the tea counties to Kangding in 
Kham.18 This well-maintained route across the bridge allowed the volume of all trade, and tea 
especially, to grow greatly.19 
Regular delivery of food, particularly rice, supported the Chinese garrisons and 
growing administration (“Xikang jingji de zhongxin” 1994, 420).20 Events such as the 
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dispatch of a Qing army to Central Tibet in 1719 to expel the Dzungar Mongolians,21 and the 
placement and support of ambans (Manchu high officials) in Lhasa, beginning in 1727, were 
greatly helped by the bridge and Kangding’s function as a springboard to the west.22 
It should not be assumed that the Qing initiated or created this trade route to 
Kangding. Indeed, contact and trade had been under way for centuries, despite the difficulties 
of traversing the Dadu River using primitive ferries and cable crossings (Ch. liusuo). The 
trails themselves were rough and rugged. A report to Emperor Kangxi reflects on the pre-
Qing situation: 
 
Because of the revolts in the late Ming, the merchants wanted to avoid these 
wars. So they risked using the cable crossings to get across the Dadu River, 
and they took tea and other products with them to Dajianlu [Kangding]. At 
precisely this same time, some Tibetan lamas arrived in Dajianlu. They began 
to do business and the population increased, so later the administrative 
position and title of yingguan was set up to control the trade. (“Xikang jingji 
de zhongxin” 1994, 419)   
 
This reference is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, by describing the state of affairs, 
it shows that interchange did take place, though the Chinese only rarely ventured beyond the 
Dadu River to Kangding. Direct trade was limited. Second, the risks of travel and transport 
are made apparent by the use of dangerous cable crossings; no bridge spanned the Dadu at 
this time. Social chaos and desperation motivated merchants to make the attempt. Third, they 
took tea, as the main item of trade, directly to the Tibetans—a most welcome occurrence for 
the latter party as this eliminated the need to travel far eastward to collect the tea. 
After the opening of the Luding Bridge in 1706, the Qing capitalized on all of these 
elements: route consolidation and the needs for road building, expansion of trade (especially 
tea), imposition of tax checkpoints, and rationalization of transport that addressed the needs 
of the military and the shipment of commodities. Such improvements highlight the 
motivations for economic, military, and political expansion. Along the main trail passed not 
only tea traders but also a range of men and occupations. These Chinese pioneers into the 
border zone and beyond represent, especially after the year 1706, the start of significant Han 
presence in areas west of the barrier range. By 1731, administrators, combined with some 
five hundred soldiers and two hundred clerks, brought the number of Qing employees living 
in Kangding to eight or nine hundred people (Wu 1990, 31). Trade, penetration, and control 
thrived under the new stability of the official road. 
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Conclusion 
 This article focuses the types and diversity of trade routes in western Sichuan, up and 
down the barrier range between China and Kham/Ngawa, with special attention paid to the 
official routes twice established by imperial China during the Ming and Qing dynasties. It 
also discusses the reasons why such a variety of routes existed, the commodities transported, 
and the larger impulses that played a part in Sino-Tibetan relations. Importantly, the article 
charts the change from tea–horse barter exchanges to a more varied tea–local products 
economy, as the market town of Kangding developed robustly in the eighteenth century and 
provided an outlet for Khampa’s abundant resources, particularly medicines, wool, gold, 
musk, and finished products. And in these exchanges, intimately tied by trade and 
commodities and sharing of the same roads and networks of contact, frequently little or no 
detailed comprehension existed of the role or activities of the other side. How much, and in 
what ways, did the Chinese and Tibetans actually understand each other? 
Engagement with the existing literature shows examples of parallel development or 
similar solutions under different circumstances, as varied sites and times actually shine light 
on the main China-Tibet exchanges, from Ya’an to Kangding, and how this became the most 
successful route for nearly two hundred years (1730–1930). Yet during this long period a 
dual set of circumstances intermingled: local adaptations and solutions to the special 
requirements of regional goods and routes, and, at the same time, the vagaries of larger 
sociopolitical concerns originating on both sides of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands. The two 
sides knew of the intimate relationship between roads and power. For the Qing Empire, this 
dyad, combined with bridge building, ultimately resulted in a good, functioning road from 
Chengdu to Kangding. 
The reasons for creating or expanding the guandao embodied China’s desire for 
increased trade, and with this trade the potential for economic, military, political, and 
territorial expansion. The ultimate goal was penetration into the Tibetan border areas and 
beyond, exemplified by the phrase “To control Tibet, first pacify Kham.” But for all involved 
in trade—including Khampa traders and trading houses, monastery merchants, Chinese 
producers and wholesalers, Muslim long-distance caravans, and smaller middlemen of all 
stripes—prudence was beneficial, and the summum bonum was to keep the tea moving and 
the trade routes open. In this search for stability and the long-term goal of securing 
permanent and reliable trading partners, we see how the many different routes, through time, 
permitted interaction between Tibetans and Chinese. 
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Notes 
 
1 Proverbially considered one of the “four pillars of life”—tsampa (barley flour), meat, 
butter, and tea—tea was the only traditional staple of Tibet that needed to be 
imported. 
2 The fifteenth-century Chronicle of China and Tibet (Dpal ’byor bzang po [15th c.] 
1979) includes two chapters on tea. 
3 Tea went from a luxury to a necessity and became the indispensable drink of 
everyday life for reasons of hydration, nutrition, digestion, social interaction, 
hospitality, and religious functions. 
4 There are many spurious publications, particularly in Yunnan Province, dealing with 
the so-called “tea–horse routes.” The reasons for this are usually commercial, 
including provincial justifications for the expansion of the tourism industry. 
5 Tea from Yunnan and southern Shaanxi played only a minor role compared to that 
from Sichuan. 
6 In all, some 120 trade items passed back and forth, making Dartsedo and Songpan 
essential “break of bulk” centers for the dispersal of goods into the Tibetan interior 
and—heading eastward—for Tibetan goods to reach China. 
7 The local Shar ba (Tibetan inhabitants of the greater Songpan area) traded with 
Chinese merchants from Songpan and certain Tibetan nomad groups, mainly 
exchanging Chinese tea for horses, wool, and other animal products from the Tibetan 
highlands. 
8 The route was largely created along steep riverbanks, and thus needed to be 
constructed with horizontal plank technology in many places. This road proved to be 
a Han engineering show of force to warn and awe the tribes of the borderland. Trade 
remained a minor element along this heavily garrisoned road. 
9 Due to its position as the northernmost of Sichuan’s five tea-producing counties, 
Qionglai successfully split its affiliation by producing tea for both the southern 
market, via Dartsedo, and the northern market, via Songpan. When Qionglai realized 
it could no longer function and compete in the Kham business, it produced and 
transported tea only for the northwest markets of Amdo, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, and 
Xinjiang. 
10 See, especially, Tsomu (2014), as well as the article by Tenzin Jinba in this issue of 
Cross-Currents, about the Jinchuan wars that took place in the Gyalrong region. 
11 See also Kangding xianzhi (1995, 175).  
12 This was the area west of the Dadu River, which included Dartsedo.  
13 Sichuan Province’s direct movement westward reshaped economic and power 
relations.   
14 In 1696, the Sichuan governor, Yu Yangchi, went on a mission to the border area and 
to meet Tibetan officials. He reported: “From Ming times, to now, it has been the 
territory which the tribal chieftains of the inner territory have controlled. It is 
appropriate [therefore] to enter it in the [Chinese] Register of Population [Ch. bantu]. 
But the Tibetans rely on the tea-trade for their living, and have lived there for many 
years. (They should be allowed to remain)… On receipt of this Memorial, the Board 
of Dependencies proposed that the Emperor permit the tea-trade as usual” (Ahmad 
1970, 227). Three years later, in 1696, a seemingly passive administrative event—the 
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entering of Dartsedo in the Population Register (Ch. bantu)—implied annexation, 
which the emperor sanctioned. 
15 See also Zeng Wenqiong and Yang Jiaming (1989, 17), citing Kangding xian tuzhi 
[Local gazetteer of Kangding] (1992). 
16 Being so soon after the war, the Qing also clearly cared about political developments 
in the area. 
17 To this day, many Tibetans believe mistakenly that Luding Bridge was constructed by 
Thangtong Gyalpo (Tib. Thang stong rgyal po), the famous fifteenth-century iron 
bridge builder. Chagzamka (Tib. Lcags zam kha) means simply “iron bridge.” 
18 After the bridge’s construction, Dartsedo changed from a place with few permanent 
buildings to a proper town. 
19 The tea trade volume reached 12.3 million jin (16 million pounds) during Emperor 
Yongzheng’s reign, a figure unsurpassed even in the late Qing and Republican 
periods (Liu 1989, 125–140). 
20 The Qing in 1717 “established post stations and liangtai [grain officers] in Dartsedo, 
Nyachukha, Lithang and Bathang” (see Tsomu 2014, 84n180). In 1719, the Manchu 
advanced by the southern route to Lhasa by way of Dartsedo, Litang, Batang, and 
Chamdo. For support, they set up further grain offices and eighty-seven military post 
stations (Ch. tangzhan).  
21 “In 1719, when a Qing general was sent to secure the lines of communication in 
Kham for a Qing expedition to Central Tibet, the Qing managed to place other parts 
of Kham under Qing control for the first time. In 1725, the areas to the west of the 
Yangtse-Mekong divide in Kham were placed under the Lhasa government, while 
east of the divide was governed by the indigenous rulers” (Tsomu 2014, 76). “In the 
third year of Yongzheng (1725), large areas of Kham were placed under the control of 
the governor-general of Sichuan Province” (Tsomu 2014, 34, 35, citing Gu et al, Qing 
shilu zangzu shiliao [1982, 311–312]). 
22 According to Lin Hsiao-ting, “Generally speaking, from 1720 until the late eighteenth 
century, the Qing gradually increased its authority in Tibet, intervening in the case of 
third-party invasions of Tibet (1720 and 1792) and internal disorders (1728 and 
1750). Each intervention resulted in an increase in Qing administrative control over 
Tibetan affairs” (Lin 2006, 8).  
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